1. What the polls say

Four independent French polls from June–July 2026 are simultaneously pointing towards their extreme quantile. This is no longer a “warning sign” — it is the condition itself.

• Legitimisation of violence among young people. 54% of militant 18–24-year-olds believe that “one must sometimes use violence to push ideas through”. Among militants over 65, the figure is just 12%. Ifop / Fondation Jean-Jaurès / MAIF.
• Trust in the system. 72% no longer trust the system to provide a decent pension; the figure is 87% among 18–34-year-olds. Ifop / Club Landoy.
• Expectation of a social wave. Eight in ten French people expect a new Yellow Vest-like movement if fuel prices rise further. Odoxa.
• Presidential defiance. Macron is on 74% unfavourable opinions — a historic low point shortly before the 2027 election. Ipsos barometer.

2. The mobilisation infrastructure is ready

“Bloquons tout” on 10 September 2025 was leaderless, organised digitally and without trade-union backing — yet it still forced the deployment of 80,000 police officers. For autumn 2026, this pattern is being repeated, now with trade-union support.

• Preparations for Bloquons Tout Île-de-France have been under way since July 2026, with the explicit ambition of “unsettling those in power as in September 2025”. Aplutsoc.
• 18 September 2026: inter-union mobilisation day; up to 900,000 demonstrators expected; 80,000 police officers deployed. Le Journal Toulousain.
• 1 May 2026: according to organisers, more than 1 million demonstrators in more than 200 cities.

3. Four classic conditions — all present

Historical sociologists (Skocpol, Tilly, Goldstone) identify four simultaneous conditions that define a revolutionary situation. All four are now present in France.

Condition	France in 2026
Fiscal state crisis	Fitch and S&P downgrades; the 2026 budget kept afloat only by the threat of censorship from the PS.
Paralysed political system	Three blocs since June 2024; three prime ministers in one year; Lecornu II narrowly survives the no-confidence vote of 6 July 2026 (132 in favour, 289 required).
Elite division	Zucman tax demanded by its own left-wing flank and rejected by both the Senate and the Assemblée; Piketty versus Macron; the De Courson commission itself criticises the tax authorities.
Mobilised mass with a belief in the legitimacy of violence	54% of young people pro-violence; Bloquons tout 2.0; inter-union mobilisation on 18 September.

The cooling of opinion on the fiscal route is not a counterforce — it is a shift in method.

4. Where the aggression is landing in policy

• Commission on speculative funds (Assemblée, unanimously on 16 June 2026): ban on majority takeovers of strategic enterprises, a blacklist of tax havens, and mandatory transparency regarding ultimate beneficial owners.
• Commission on the highest fortunes (De Courson report, 8 July 2026): eleven recommendations, explicitly stating that the tax authorities cannot grasp the true wealth of the richest fortunes.
• LFI rhetoric in summer 2026: Panot (revoking the nationality of departing millionaires), Mélenchon (“46,000 ultra-rich people who pay not a euro in tax”), Piketty (referendum on a €800 billion solidarity tax).

5. The apparent cooling is a shift

Odoxa July 2026: support for “tax the rich more heavily to close the deficit” falls from 80% (2024) to 68% (2026), most sharply among 18–34-year-olds (from 73–78% to 55–57%). Headline in Challenges/Odoxa: “hatred of the rich is losing steam in France”.

Wrong reading: hatred is declining. The correct reading: the same age group that is abandoning the fiscal route is also the group in which 54% now consider violence legitimate. The 12 percentage points lost by taxation as a solution are not translating into resignation. They are going towards other methods.

6. Likely scenarios (July 2026 – 2027)

Scenario	Form	Trigger
1 · September 2026 as the first release of pressure	Bloquons tout 2.0 + inter-union mobilisation on 18 September + budget debate + another downgrade.	2026 budget, fuel price, rating downgrade
2 · Expansion of physical aggression beyond crypto	H2 2026 – H1 2027. The first high-profile case outside crypto makes the pattern public.	First incident outside the crypto sector
3 · 2027 electoral crisis	RN wins or comes very close. Elites refuse to legitimise it. Post-election escalation is possible.	2027 result, court rulings
4 · Targeted intimidation of individuals	Additional to 1 or 3. Industrialists, former ministers and prominent entrepreneurs as “symbols of wealth”.	Symbolic figure caught in a media storm