Since Balkenende, no Dutch prime minister has been willing to say out loud what every economist in The Hague privately knows: the 44 percent government debt we boast about is not a lie, but it is only half the story. The real burden we are passing on to our children runs toward 250 percent of GDP in gross obligations. And that is only the accounting layer. Beneath it lies an even bigger error: we have simultaneously and systematically dismantled the productive base of our country. Nuclear power shut down, energy costs driven up, industry chased out the door, the cleanup costs of wind and solar pushed into the future, and at all three levels of government every brake on spending released.

Why this triptych

This triptych brings those admissions of debt together. Not as a partisan attack — every coalition since 2002 has contributed to it, including the parties most of us once voted for. Not as a declaration of war on unions or employers — we all sat at the same incomplete table. But as the factual foundation for the conversation we must have at the bargaining table, in the city council, in Brussels, and at the dinner table. Without honest figures there is no honest negotiation. Without acknowledgment there is no mandate for the transition that is needed. And without that transition we saddle our children with a country we ourselves would no longer want to inherit.

"Honesty makes government possible. As long as we conceal reality, every negotiation is a shadow play — and we all lose, including those who think they are booking short-term gains."

The triptych is built around one common thread: passing the buck. But before we can honestly discuss that debt, we must repair the denominator in which that debt is expressed: GDP itself. That is Part 0. Part I then addresses the statistical embellishment with which we hide the government debt — and the €1,750 billion pension pot that softens but does not remove the picture. An interlude shows how the Netherlands compares to France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the UK and Greece; that European picture is the key to why the Netherlands specifically must open the conversation. Part II shows how we are destroying the industrial and energy base and shifting cleanup costs to 2050. Part III shows that we — unlike Germany — have no constitutional brake on spending at any level of government. At the close: an invitation to cooperation, even with those we now still see as opponents.

Part 0 — The concealed denominator

Why every debt percentage begins with the wrong divisor

Every time we say "44% government debt" or "110% net honest debt", we use the same divisor: gross domestic product. We assume that divisor measures the size of the Dutch economy — the productive strength with which we can carry our debts. But that assumption is the first mistake. GDP as reported by CBS is not a measure of production. It is a sum in which three kinds of items are mixed together:

• Real production. Factories making goods, drivers transporting, nurses caring, farmers growing. This is what an economy actually produces.
• Accounting imputations. Imputed rent (€97 billion in 2024): CBS pretends homeowners pay themselves rent — pure statistics, no euro changes hands. FISIM (€40 billion): a constructed "price" for banking services derived from the margin between deposit and lending rates. R&D capitalization since SNA 2010: research spending that used to be consumption now counts as investment. Extraction of natural resources without depreciation of natural capital.
• Redistribution artifacts. Social benefits (€230 billion) are not booked directly into GDP, but the consumption that results from them is — with the effect that unemployment becomes statistically invisible and GDP camouflages the loss of production.

The PBW formula — what remains after correction

I have therefore developed an alternative measure: Productive Broad Prosperity (PBW). It is not an ivory-tower alternative; it combines existing economic insights — Kuznets' warning (1962) that GDP was never meant as a welfare measure, Okun's Law (1962) on the costs of unemployment, and Mazzucato's distinction between value creation and value extraction — into a single testable indicator. The formula:

PBW = (GDP − Imputed rent − FISIM) × (Employed / Labor force) − Benefits + Okun correction

And this is not a snapshot. When you trace PBW back to 2000 using CBS time series, you see a structural pattern: the load-bearing core fluctuates between 56% and 66% of GDP, with a dip in 2010 (financial crisis) and recovery toward 64% in 2024. That is not a linear erosion but an indicator that moves with the health of the real economy — and it structurally runs 35 to 44 percentage points lower than reported GDP growth suggests.

For 2024, PBW comes out at €709 billion — 62.9% of officially reported GDP. More than a third of what we call "the Dutch economy" thus consists of accounting constructs, redistribution consumption, and improper treatment of human capital. That is not fraud on the part of CBS — they faithfully follow the internationally agreed System of National Accounts. It is a political choice to present that system as the truth.

What PBW does to the debt figures

As soon as you use PBW instead of official GDP as the denominator, all the debt figures change dramatically:

Debt indicator	Size (€bn)	On official GDP	On PBW
EMU debt (Layer 1)	€500bn	44%	68%
Incl. ageing commitments (Layer 2)	€740bn	65%	104%
Gross implicit total (Layer 3)	€2,830bn	250%	400%
Net honest debt (Layer 4)	€1,243bn	110%	170%

PBW 2024: €709bn. Calculated as (GDP − imputed rent − FISIM) × employed/labor force − benefits + Okun correction.

The message of this section is not: throw out GDP. The message is: look at both. When a minister says "our debt is 44% of GDP, well below the EU norm of 60%", that is statistically correct. But on the real productive base, that same debt is 68% of PBW — above the very limit we ourselves apply. The ageing commitment (Layer 2) is 104% on PBW — one to one with the productive base. And the net honest debt is 170% of PBW: more than a year and a half of production of what we actually generate.

For the rest of this article I will, for readability, continue to use the official GDP percentages, because those are the figures politicians and journalists use. But in the comparison tables I will consistently show the PBW alternatives alongside them, so the reader sees both dashboards. The bill is bigger than policy jargon suggests — and it begins with the divisor.

"Distinctions must be kept in mind between quantity and quality of growth, between costs and returns, and between the short and long run. Goals for more growth should specify more growth of what and for what." — Simon Kuznets, 1962

Part I — The Hidden Bill

On the four layers of Dutch government debt and why 44% is half a truth

The figures officially communicated

At the end of 2025, Dutch government debt stood at €524 billion — exactly 44.4 percent of GDP. The cabinet forecasts debt of 46.6 percent for 2026, rising to over 50 percent in 2031. In all communication to unions, employers and citizens, this figure is used as proof that "the Netherlands has done well" — far below the EU norm of 60 percent, far below the EU average of 81.7 percent.

This figure is not a lie. It is calculated according to the European EMU definition and is accurate to the last euro. But it is a snapshot of bonds issued — not of obligations. And that is where the story begins.

Four layers: from 44% to 110% honest debt

Layer 2 — Already committed, not yet booked as EMU debt

As soon as you consolidate what the government has already pledged but not yet booked as EMU debt — multi-year commitments for defense, the Climate Fund, Groningen damage settlement, nitrogen buy-out schemes, the structural state pension shortfall covered from general funds, plus state guarantees and holdings — you arrive considerably higher. It is no coincidence that the Study Group on the Budgetary Framework advised €7 billion in structural cuts just to stabilize the debt at all. Realistic estimate for this layer: roughly 65 percent of GDP.

Layer 3 — Gross implicit obligations

This is the layer that is systematically massaged out of politics. State pension (AOW) and long-term care are largely paid from general funds without corresponding coverage. The CPB itself estimates that under unchanged policy, debt on a pure EMU basis will rise to 126 percent of GDP by 2060. If you include implicit pension commitments — the classic implicit pension debt — you land gross in the range of 200 to 250 percent of GDP. According to the Senate, the sustainability gap amounts to 1.6 percent of GDP per year, or roughly €16 billion structurally short. The WRR warns explicitly: financing pensions through rising government debt shifts the bill to future generations.

Layer 4 — Net honest debt: 110% of GDP

And then comes the correction that softens but does not remove the picture. Thanks to its funded second pillar, the Netherlands has by far the largest pension wealth in Europe: roughly €1,750 billion, or 159 percent of GDP. At an average tax rate of 35 percent on pension payouts, the government holds a latent tax claim of roughly 55 percent of GDP on that — the reversal rule says: contributions untaxed, payouts taxed. The Netherlands also owns state holdings (Schiphol, Gasunie, TenneT), infrastructure and valuable public assets; historically, moreover, €417 billion in natural gas revenues was collected between 1969 and 2021, part of which is implicitly embedded in public services.

Net — that is, after deducting these offsets — the honest Dutch debt comes out at roughly 100 to 120 percent of GDP. That is still nearly twice the EU norm of 60 percent, and more than double the official figure of 44 percent. But it is fundamentally different from the bare 250 percent without correction. And it is precisely this combination — high implicit burden with a substantial offset — that gives the Netherlands a unique position in Europe.

The statistical embellishment: imputed rent

Besides concealing obligations, the denominator — the GDP against which the debt ratio is calculated — is also systematically inflated. CBS books the so-called "imputed rent" of owner-occupied homes at €54 billion per year as household production, as if homeowners rent their house to themselves at market price. With GDP of around €1,100 billion, that is 5 percent of GDP that exists purely on paper: no euro traded, no tax levied, no service delivered to a third party.

This is not a uniquely Dutch trick — the US (6.2%), the UK (10%), Japan (10%) and Ireland do the same under the ESA 2010 standard. What does distinguish the Netherlands: Eurostat found that imputed rent reduces income inequality in almost all EU countries — except in the Netherlands and Norway, where it actually increases inequality. Even the social justification fails here.

Interlude — The European Mirror

Why the Netherlands specifically must open the European conversation — the four layers for twelve countries

Before you think we are doing badly: let me hold up a mirror. When you apply the same four layers to eleven comparable European countries, you arrive at a picture that Dutch politics keeps out of communication at all costs — but that in fact gives the Netherlands the standing to be the first to tell the truth.

Country	EMU debt	Pension pot (2nd pillar)	Net honest on GDP	Net honest on PBW
Netherlands	44%	159% GDP	~110%	~170%
Denmark	30%	206% GDP	~45%	~76%
Sweden	35%	~90% GDP	~50%	~87%
Norway (GPFG)	55%	490% GDP	−335%	−557%
Poland	60%	~9% GDP	~231%	~365%
Germany	64%	~7% GDP	~333%	~551%
UK	103%	100% GDP	~240%	~388%
Belgium	105%	8% GDP	~190%	~356%
Spain	106%	11% GDP	~175%	~325%
France	113%	9% GDP	~240%	~485%
Italy	138%	11% GDP	~245%	~466%
Greece	155%	1% GDP	~210%	~379%

Sources: Eurostat Q4 2025; OECD Pension Markets in Focus 2025; Netspar/PSE/Cato Institute; Eurostat Pensions in national accounts 2024.

What stands out — five insights

The Dutch position is fundamentally different from that of comparable European economies. Five things stand out that should shift the conversation in the Netherlands:

• The Netherlands has by far the strongest buffer. With 159% of GDP in pension wealth, we score twice as high as Switzerland and Canada, and fifteen to twenty times higher than France (9%), Italy (11%), Belgium (8%) or Spain (11%).
• Our net honest debt is the lowest among non-Scandinavian European countries. On official GDP: 110% (NL) against 190% (Belgium), 240% (France/UK), 245% (Italy), 175% (Spain), 210% (Greece), 333% (Germany). On PBW: 170% (NL) against 356-551% for those other countries. Only Denmark (76%), Sweden (87%) and Norway (−557%) do significantly better thanks to their sovereign funds. Germany is a cautionary tale: 64% EMU debt sounds modest, but with its weak pension pot and heavy ageing, net honest debt exceeds 550% of PBW.
• For France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Greece, admission has become politically impossible. Bruegel calculates that France must improve its primary balance by 4-5% of GDP just to keep pace with ageing alone. The same applies to Italy. According to the Paris School of Economics, French implicit pension debt lies between 210 and 470 percent of GDP. A French president who admitted this would lose his government within weeks.
• We can carry the burden — they cannot. That makes our pension wealth not an excuse to stay silent, but precisely a mandate to speak. We are the only ones who can bear the truth without the system immediately imploding.
• Europe's implicit debt is a systemic risk. The European Commission classifies eleven member states as "high fiscal sustainability risk", including Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Greece. If one of them collapses, it drags the eurozone — and thus the Netherlands — down with it. Our €1,750 billion pension pot is partly invested in precisely those European bonds. Our safety depends on their reforms.

"Our pension pot does not make us immune. It makes us precisely the ones authorized to tell the truth — because we are the only ones who can bear it without the system imploding."

Why this is the Netherlands' role

Traditionally, the Netherlands is Europe's treasurer — the petit-bourgeois bookkeeper of "keep your house in order". That is not a strong role in political negotiations; the French and Italians are irritated by it, and rightly so. But when you carry out the four-layer analysis, it becomes clear that the Netherlands can play a different role: that of honest broker. We are not the frugal accountant lecturing everyone else. We are the party that dares to present the honest sum precisely because we are the only one who has built up the offset needed to find the way back together.

That completely changes the frame in Brussels. Instead of "The Hague is nagging about budget discipline again", it becomes: "The Netherlands puts Europe's debt honestly on the table — including its own 110% — and invites a joint reform path." That is a fundamentally different position, and it has been politically available for the first time since Kok.

Why this poisons wage negotiations

Back to the Dutch domestic table. The frame "we have been frugal, there is room for +X%" only holds if you look exclusively at Layer 1. As soon as Layers 2, 3 and even 4 are on the table — 110% of GDP net — there is structurally no room for the usual collective bargaining scheme. Unions sense this, without knowing the exact figures. Employers sense it too. The result: everyone at the table defends their own position based on figures everyone knows are incomplete. That is no longer a negotiation, it is a shadow play.

44% visible, 65% committed, 250% gross obligated, 110% net after offsets — twice the EU norm, and a sustainability gap of 1.6% of GDP per year.

Then the conversation is no longer "divide the profit", but "divide the adjustment burden". A fundamentally different negotiation. And — crucially — a negotiation in which unions and employers can choose the same side: against passing the buck to the children. That is a coalition that does not exist today, but may become possible tomorrow once the figures are honestly on the table.

Part II — The Children's Bill

On nuclear power, expensive alternatives, cleanup costs and the slow killing of Dutch industry

The nuclear mistake — Germany and the Netherlands

In April 2023, Germany shut down its last three nuclear reactors — Isar 2, Emsland and Neckarwestheim 2. The official narrative: no price shocks, no supply problems, more renewables, less coal. Technically true in the short term, because industry was in recession and demand had collapsed at the time. As soon as Germany climbs out of recession, even the DIHK (German Chamber of Commerce) warns that the price effect will still become visible.

The industrial reality is meanwhile merciless: BASF is moving 10 percent of its Ludwigshafen production to China and the US. ThyssenKrupp is shrinking steel production. Volkswagen is closing factories on home soil for the first time in 87 years. The Netherlands has not formally done so dramatically — Borssele keeps running until 2033 — but between 1997 and 2020 we wasted twenty-three years in which no new construction was realized at all. France currently exports 50 to 90 TWh per year to its neighbors at record prices; largely to Germany and indirectly to us. So we do pay for French nuclear power, we just don't get the proceeds.

The cleanup bill toward 2050

TNO calculates €172,500 per MW for the complete removal of an offshore wind farm. The Netherlands currently has around 5 GW of offshore wind, growing toward 21 GW by 2030 and 50 GW by 2050. That means a future obligation of €8 to €9 billion for offshore decommissioning alone — on top of onshore wind and solar. For onshore turbines, the American Institute for Energy Research estimates $100,000 to $410,000 per turbine. For solar panels, RIVM shows that common practice is downcycling: only the aluminum frame and cables are reused.

And who ends up footing that bill? Precisely what this triptych is about: the children. The American National Center for Energy Analytics puts it literally: "consumers or taxpayers—not the owners—will likely be left to pay a significant portion of the $50 billion or more in future decommissioning costs". Decommissioning bonds are systematically waived by regulators because projects would otherwise not be profitable — a structural accounting trick, precisely analogous to the implicit government debt from Part I.

The slow killing of industry

The industrial electricity price in the Netherlands in 2024 was around 16 ct/kWh — twice as high as in the US and China (8 ct), twice that of France (8 ct), and in the same range as the UK (22 ct) and Japan (20 ct). A Dutch study for parliament shows that Dutch baseload industrial customers will pay €64/MWh more in 2030 than their German and French competitors, purely due to the absence of exemptions for network costs and levies.

On top of that comes the accumulation of the tax burden. The collective tax burden rose from 36.5% (2015) to 39.5% (2021), dipped slightly to 38.9% (2022), and has since been climbing back toward 40%. The extraordinary increase in the minimum wage in January 2024 (+10.15%) raised labor costs in industry, healthcare, and agriculture and horticulture in one stroke. The Netherlands now has one of the highest minimum wages in purchasing-power parity in Europe, while energy-intensive industry is heading for the exit.

What you might call the murder of industry has a name in economic jargon: structural energy cost disadvantage. The IMF and OECD have explicitly pointed this out to the Netherlands and Germany since 2023. We have simultaneously shut down the cheapest reliable power source (nuclear), stacked the most expensive variable sources (wind and solar), piled on network and levy costs, and driven up labor costs through the minimum wage and the tax burden. Each pillar alone is defensible. Stacked together it is industrial suicide. And — this is the bridge to Part III — there is no law that stops this.

Part III — Without a Brake

On spending drift at all levels of government and the absence of a Dutch debt brake

The German brake — why it does not exist in the Netherlands

Since 2016, the German federal government may not net borrow more than 0.35 percent of GDP. This is constitutionally enshrined in Article 115(2) of the Grundgesetz — the so-called Schuldenbremse. In November 2023, the Federal Constitutional Court declared a €60 billion shift between funds constitutionally invalid. Even the German government therefore cannot shift funds freely.

The Netherlands has never introduced a constitutional brake of this kind. The Zalm norm — an informal agreement, not a law — has been systematically abandoned and is even openly being buried in the pages of NRC. Sondervermögen-like constructions (Climate Fund, National Growth Fund, Defense Fund) do exist, but escape equivalent constitutional oversight. And historical natural gas revenues — €417 billion between 1969 and 2021 — have largely disappeared into general funds without a sovereign wealth fund like Norway's.

Municipalities: spending doubled in fifteen years

The Municipal Fund grew from €27.3 billion in 2015 to €42.2 billion in 2023 and continues growing to €49.1 billion in 2029 — an average structural increase of €1.6 billion per year. Municipal spending per capita rose from €3,822 in 2023 to €4,650 in 2025 — a 22 percent increase in two years. Total municipal budget for 2025: €80 billion, a doubling since around 2010. Add provinces and the national government, and there is no law that says: this is the norm per capita, this is where it stops.

Three levels without a brake

Government level	Brake?	Effect
National government	None	Zalm norm abandoned, no constitutional limit, EU norm of 60% never made binding.
Provinces	None	Provincial fund grows unchecked, no spending norm per capita.
Municipalities	None	€3,822 → €4,650 per capita in two years (+22%). Budget doubled since 2010.
Germany (federal)	Yes: 0.35% of GDP	Constitutionally enshrined since 2016. Enforceable via the Federal Constitutional Court.

It is not that we have made mistakes. We have systematically chosen not to make choices. That is the most fundamental difference from Germany — and that is where our real debt lies. But what we have neglected, we can repair today.

Part III bis — The forbidden question

What if we turn the gas back on and build South Groningen?

As long as we stand by an honest admission, we must also dare to ask the most controversial question: what happens if the Netherlands reopens its gas sources and finally rewards the people of Groningen generously? This has become politically taboo — and precisely for that reason it must be confronted. Not out of nostalgia, but to show that even this most wishful-thinking solution does not work without the other reforms.

What is still in the ground?

The hard geological facts: the Groningen field was permanently closed in April 2024, but still contains around 470 billion m³ of recoverable gas. The small fields onshore and in the North Sea count roughly 71 billion m³ of proven reserves, with TNO estimates adding 115 to 150 billion m³ of geological potential on top. EBN director Van Hoogstraten stated in April 2025: "There is still at least 100 Bcm of gas under the Dutch North Sea. This natural gas can make a major contribution to our energy independence.". All together: 400 to 770 billion m³ — depending on how aggressively reopening and exploration are pursued. The Groningen reserve alone, at a gas price of €37/MWh, is worth roughly €174 billion gross — nearly one-sixth of current annual GDP.

And that is the cautious estimate. SEB Research put the 2025 TTF average at €38.7/MWh in September 2025, with a forecast of €34/MWh for 2026 and €30/MWh for 2027 once the LNG wave from the US, Qatar and Canada arrives. But SEB simultaneously warns of "higher for longer" through 2025-26: winter tightness, storage lagging behind last year, Norwegian supply limited by maintenance, and Asian restocking tightening the Atlantic market. Every step back in Russian LNG imports to Europe pushes the price further up. And every new well drilled in the Dutch North Sea increases recoverable reserves. So the question is not whether the reserves will become worth more than we now think — but how much more.

Four scenarios calculated

The calculation works as follows. Historically, the Dutch state collected around 70% of gross gas revenue through mining rights, royalties, EBN participation and corporate tax. At 20% extraction costs and the historical distribution formula, the state's net proceeds come to gross revenue times 0.56. Subtract the €85 billion resident compensation plus €35 billion Markerwaard investment, and add the €14 billion tax return from the GDP multiplier, and this remains:

Scenario	Volume	Gross revenue	Net to state	Debt GDP / PBW
Cautious (400bn m³ @ €34/MWh)	400bn m³	€136bn	−€30bn	113% / 180%
Realistic (620bn m³ @ €40/MWh)	620bn m³	€248bn	+€33bn	107% / 170%
Tightness (670bn m³ @ €50/MWh)	670bn m³	€335bn	+€82bn	103% / 164%
Tightness + drilling (770bn m³ @ €55/MWh)	770bn m³	€424bn	+€131bn	98% / 156%

Calculation: 10 kWh/m³ calorific value; government share 70% of gross revenue minus 20% extraction costs; €85bn residents + €35bn Markerwaard − €14bn tax return.

South Groningen — the circular deal

Up to this point it was only about money returning to the treasury. But the real breakthrough lies elsewhere. Somewhere on the northern flank of the Randstad, 40,000 to 60,000 new homes must be built — a modern, decarbonized city to be called South Groningen. That turns the gas deal from a remote payout into a concrete move to a new home in a new region — financed from the same ground.

Three possible locations

There are three serious options, each with its own pros and cons. The choice is a political decision that must be made based on environmental impact assessment, IJsselmeer hydrology and Natura 2000 fit. But the options exist:

• Option A — Markerwaard (60,000 ha). The fourth IJsselmeer polder, called off in 1986. Largest capacity (up to 60,000 homes plus agriculture and industry), but the most far-reaching intervention in the IJsselmeer system and the highest reclamation costs (~€15-20bn). Full realization 15-20 years.
• Option B — Expansion of Almere Pampus and IJmeerpolder. Almere already has concrete plans for 7,500 homes in Pampus with an IJmeer connection to Amsterdam. Expansion to 40,000-50,000 homes through adjoining reclamation of the southern IJmeer. Fastest start date (existing planning), lower reclamation costs (~€8-12bn), but smaller maximum capacity than Markerwaard.
• Option C — Wieringermeer expansion toward the Afsluitdijk. Adjoining the existing Wieringermeer polder in North Holland. Spatially most logical given the northern Dutch economic corridor, and closer to the gas sources. Smaller scale (20,000-30,000 homes), but fastest political feasibility and best connection to existing infrastructure.

My preference is a combined route B+C: Almere Pampus as the first tranche (starting 2026-2030), Wieringermeer expansion as the second tranche (2028-2035). Together roughly 65,000 homes, spread over two locations so the housing market and construction sector are not overloaded. Markerwaard remains an option for a possible third phase after 2040. Total reclamation costs: ~€20 billion — exactly the budget in the scenario.

What makes this fundamentally different from a classic damages payout is the multiplier running through the construction sector. When a Groningen family receives €400,000 and spends it on a new-build home in the Markerwaard, the money goes to Dutch contractors, Dutch workers, Dutch suppliers. Wage tax, VAT, corporate tax and employer contributions flow back to the state. The CPB reckons construction investment multipliers of 1.3-1.5 and a tax burden of 40% — meaning that of the €35 billion in extra GDP from the Markerwaard project, roughly €14 billion flows back to the treasury as tax.

More importantly: the project solves three crises at once. Housing crisis — 40 to 60,000 new homes is ~5% of the national shortage. Construction sector — 60,000 to 80,000 jobs over 10 to 15 years, in a sector currently emptying out due to the nitrogen crisis and interest-rate shock. Trade balance — 30 billion m³ of domestic gas plus domestic construction structurally replaces €40 billion in annual imports. Add that Dutch industry — Chemelot, Rotterdam, Tata — again gets competitive gas, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The differentiated sunset principle

The priority arrangement for Groningen residents does not run equally long for everyone. Whoever lives in the core zone (Zone 1) gets 7 years of priority on homes in South Groningen — because they have the heaviest damage and the most complex relocation challenge. Whoever lives in the border zone (Zone 2) gets 5 years of priority — standard sunset. Whoever lives in the outer zone (Zone 3) gets 3 years of priority — because the damage there is more limited and relocation pressure lower. Each gets first right of purchase, a 20% price discount, and a relocation budget on top of the individual payout.

After these terms, priority expires and the remaining homes open up to all Dutch citizens — under normal allocation rules. That is the sunset principle: restoration is temporary, equality is permanent. And the differentiation ensures that whoever has suffered most gets the most time to relocate.

This principle deserves to be introduced everywhere in Dutch policy. Restorative measures — whether for Groningen, the childcare benefits scandal, colonial legacy or other historical injustices — should always have a clear end date, differentiated by the severity of the injustice suffered. Not out of stinginess, but out of respect for legal equality. A priority arrangement without a sunset becomes a new injustice. A sunset without ample priority is not real repair. A sunset without differentiation is a blunt instrument. All three must go together. This proposal makes that explicit.

Four honest truths

• Gas is not a solution to the debt. Even full reopening yields at mid-price only 1 percentage point of GDP per year to the state over 15-20 years. By that time, implicit debt from ageing will have risen by more than €100 billion. Gas races against ageing — and loses.
• Gas is indeed a solution for Groningen. The €85 billion resident compensation in my scenario is differentiated by damage intensity (see table below). That is decently financed from the region's own proceeds. No tax increase needed. A fundamentally different scale than the current fixed compensation.
• Gas is also a solution for industry and the housing crisis. This is often forgotten. 30 billion m³/year of domestic production means Dutch industry gets gas below the EU market price, dependence on imports from Russia, Qatar and the US drops sharply, the chemical cluster (Chemelot, Rotterdam) stays viable, and the trade balance structurally improves by €40 billion per year. And the Markerwaard reclamation gives the construction sector — currently emptying out — a decade of orders and the Netherlands 40-60,000 extra homes.
• Gas is the bridge, not the destination. According to TNO, North Sea production ends in 2035 without investment. With reopening, that becomes 2050-2055 — 25 years to build up nuclear power (Borssele 2 and 3, SMRs), set up hydrogen infrastructure, and modernize industry without forced relocation.

Differentiated payout — damage determines compensation

A flat payout of €400,000 per household is politically simple but falls short on fairness: someone with a cracked foundation and a long reinforcement process deserves more than someone with only cosmetic cracks. Research by TU Delft has mapped the damage gradations in the earthquake area. Based on that, the amount is allocated by zone:

Zone	Characteristic	Households	Payout per household	Total
Zone 1 — Core area	Severely damaged and reinforced homes	~10,000	€600,000	€6.0bn
Zone 2 — Border area	Multiple damage cases	~15,000	€400,000	€6.0bn
Zone 3 — Outer area	Single damage cases or value decline	~10,000	€300,000	€3.0bn
Total	~35,000 households	35,000	avg. €428,500	€15.0bn

Zone indication: based on the TU Delft classification (2016); final boundaries to be set by an independent commission. Payout indexed, disbursed over 25 years.

The differentiated approach: €600,000 in the core area (10,000 households with severely damaged or reinforced homes), €400,000 in the border area (15,000 households with multiple damage cases), €300,000 in the outer area (10,000 households with single damage or value decline). Total 35,000 households, averaging €428,500 — exactly the amount in the overall calculation. This way the most severely affected resident gets the most, while the border area also receives substantial compensation without the core suffering for it. Final zone boundaries will be set by an independent commission based on objective damage data.

Constitutional conditions — five safeguards

The people of Groningen no longer trust the state — and rightly so. Every promise that "the proceeds are for you" is heard against sixty years of broken promises. When we collected €417 billion in natural gas revenues between 1963 and 2021 and Groningen saw less than 1% of it returned, promising again without hard safeguards is politically impossible.

The only responsible route is therefore a constitutional anchoring of five principles before a single tap is opened:

• All net proceeds into the Groningen Fund. Not a single euro to general funds. Managed on the strict Norwegian GPFG model, with a binding rule that a maximum of 3% of the fund value may be withdrawn per year — and only for investment in the region and the energy transition.
• Differentiated payout per household enshrined in law. No political adjustment afterward. €600,000 (Zone 1) / €400,000 (Zone 2) / €300,000 (Zone 3), indexed, disbursed over 25 years. Final zone boundaries set by an independent commission. Comparable to the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend — what is promised gets paid.
• Veto right for the province. Every production decision requires the consent of the province of Groningen and the municipal councils in the earthquake area. No more unilateral decisions from The Hague. If residents say "no", the gas stays in the ground.
• Linking gas to housing construction, enshrined constitutionally. No gas production without the simultaneous start of South Groningen housing construction (Markerwaard, Almere Pampus or Wieringermeer). No housing construction without gas money. The two decisions become a single package — so that neither the gas revenues disappear into general funds, nor the housing pledge can be decoupled and watered down to a token gesture.
• Differentiated sunset principle by law. Priority does not run equally long for everyone. Zone 1 (core area): 7 years of priority — they deserve the longest transition time, since their damage is greatest and their logistical challenge (dismantling a damaged home, building new) most complex. Zone 2 (border area): 5 years of priority — standard sunset. Zone 3 (outer area): 3 years of priority — their damage is more limited and they usually face less relocation pressure. After these terms, priority automatically expires and remaining homes open up to all Dutch citizens. Comparable to the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: what is promised gets paid — what is not promised is not quietly added.

"We should have done this forty years ago. What Norway did, we neglected to do — and the bill was passed on to Groningen. If we now want to extract gas again, that mistake must first be constitutionally repaired."

What the scenario teaches us

The gas scenario, linked to the South Groningen land reclamation, is more than an additional lever — it is a circular deal that tackles four crises at once. At a realistic TTF price, net honest debt falls by 3 percentage points (GDP) and 5 percentage points (PBW) respectively; with tightness-plus-drilling, by 12 (GDP) and 19 (PBW) percentage points respectively. On top come payouts of up to €600,000 per Groningen household in the core zone, 40 to 60,000 new homes, 60 to 80,000 construction jobs, and a structurally better trade balance. The effect is too large to wave away without substantive debate — but at the same time it is no miracle solution: even in the best scenario, net honest debt on PBW remains above 150%. That makes the admission and the reforms all the more necessary.

But it is emphatically not an alternative to honest accounting, a debt brake, or a truth commission. It is a supplement to them. Whoever says "bring back gas, no reforms" sells the same deception as whoever says "no admission, we did fine". Both close their eyes to the bill that lies ahead. The gas + Markerwaard scenario only works after the admission, embedded in the truth commission, bound by constitutional sunsets. Otherwise it becomes again what it became in 1963: a large debt landing on the wrong shoulders.

Close — The Invitation

Why admission is not weakness but the beginning of cooperation with those we now still see as opponents

The four-step invitation

No reform has public support as long as the figures are dishonest. Without admission there is no mandate for painful measures. Gerhard Schröder did it in March 2003 with his Agenda 2010 — it cost him power personally, but Germany reaped the benefits for fifteen years. The Dutch equivalent has been missing since Wim Kok. But in 2026 we have something Schröder did not have in 2003: €1,750 billion in pension wealth as proof that we can carry the burden, and the lowest net honest debt among comparable European countries. So we do not come to the admission empty-handed — we come with an invitation.

• Step 1 — Acknowledge the four layers and the denominator. 44% is not a lie, but it is a quarter of the story. The real net honest burden is 110% of official GDP — and 170% of PBW, the real productive base. Both must be explicitly named — not as an attack but as reality. Without PBW alongside GDP, we are steering by a cockpit instrument that does not register the engine failure.
• Step 2 — Name the shared complicity. Unions made wage demands based on 44%. Employers postponed investments because they never got the real figures. Municipalities built budgets on implicit national pledges that were never funded. Coalitions structurally passed the buck. We have all steered by the wrong figures — including myself. That suddenly turns "enemies at the table" into fellow sufferers.
• Step 3 — Publish a corrected national annual report according to the German standard: four-layer debt, implicit obligations made explicit, Sondervermögen-like constructions transparently separated out, spending per capita per level of government. Publish it before Budget Day, independent of the cabinet, and make it binding for all negotiating tables that year.
• Step 4 — Introduce a Dutch debt brake at the constitutional level, plus per-capita spending norms for the national government, provinces and municipalities. Binding. Enforceable by the Supreme Court. And — crucially — drawn up in consultation with unions, employer associations, the VNG, the IPO, and the opposition. Not imposed by a coalition.

The great enemies are now the great allies

This is the core of the invitation. As long as the figures are dishonest, every negotiation is a zero-sum game — if the union wins, employers lose, and vice versa. As soon as the four layers are on the table, the game shifts: unions and employers suddenly share the same interest — not passing the buck to their members' children. Industry suddenly shares the same interest as the labor movement — the €1,750 billion pension pot is, for both parties, the guarantee that the Netherlands can invest without crisis. Municipalities suddenly share the same interest as the national government — a debt brake protects them against unfunded decentralizations.

Even with European partners the dynamic shifts. If the Netherlands honestly shows its 110% and, at the same time, its 159% buffer, the discussion in Brussels is no longer "The Hague is lecturing us". It becomes: "If the Netherlands dares to do this, we must too." France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Greece cannot politically take the first step — their figures are too dramatic. We can. That is not weakness on their part — it is our responsibility as honest broker.

Institutional action: a Truth Commission on Government Accounting

Concretely, I propose a Dutch Truth Commission on Government Accounting — modeled on the German/Swedish system — with a legally anchored reporting obligation covering:

• The four layers of government debt (EMU, committed, gross implicit, net after offsets).
• Future climate and decommissioning obligations — offshore wind, onshore wind, solar PV, hydrogen, battery storage.
• Spending per capita per level of government, annually compared against OECD benchmarks.
• Industrial competitiveness: energy prices, labor costs, net effective tax burden versus competing countries.
• European comparison of the four layers — the Netherlands as honest broker in EU reforms.

This commission must be politically independent, with a mandate comparable to the Court of Audit, but broader — including implicit obligations. Its report must be published mandatorily ahead of every Budget Day, and must not be amendable by the cabinet. Unions, employers, the VNG, the IPO and the EU get seats on the supervisory board. Then we have an institution that makes the conversation possible instead of blocking it.

We must roll up our sleeves — together

We may not leave our children a 110% net honest government debt heading toward 200% or more. That means my generation, and the generation above me, must work harder, work longer, and consume more wisely — not because a politician says so, but because the arithmetic says so. And because we love our children. Every Dutch person understands "rolling up sleeves": it is direct, practical, un-Hollywood. But rolling up sleeves means something different in 2026 than in 1948. It does not mean: working harder for less pay. It means: calculating more honestly together, investing more wisely together, standing stronger together in Europe.

"We must roll up our sleeves. Not out of penance, but because we love our children. And not alone — but together with those we see as enemies today but will recognize as allies tomorrow."

This is not a partisan attack

Every coalition since 2002 has contributed to passing the buck. Balkenende I through IV. Rutte I through IV. Schoof. This triptych is therefore not an indictment of any one party — it is an indictment of a system in which it has become politically impossible to tell the truth without immediately losing the next election. It is precisely that system that must be broken. And that can only happen if a broad coalition of union leaders, industrial entrepreneurs, municipal councilors, opposition parties and citizens jointly say: enough. We want honest figures. We want to roll up our sleeves. We do not want to saddle our children with this bill. And we want to do that together — with whoever it takes.

That is the invitation. Whoever accepts it opens the door to the first honest Dutch term of government since Wim Kok. Whoever refuses it chooses to let our children pay the bill — and will sooner or later have to explain that to their own grandchildren.