The manifesto in running form

Preface

Europe in 2026 faces a double pressure. On one side Brussels, which with Pillar Two, CBAM, Fit-for-55, the Migration Pact and NGEU-MFF is grinding down the prosperity base. On the other side Washington, which with reciprocal tariffs, OBBBA, deregulation and DOGE burdens that same base still harder.

The figures are on the table. Five Consequences Maps — for the Netherlands, Germany, Malta, the EU as a whole, and the United States under Trump — show, in modelled terms, what this means for twenty representative European cases. The picture is uniformly red, except in one column. That column is called Nova Democratia.

This manifesto describes what sits in that column.

Not as an ideological programme. Not as left or right. As arithmetic plus five concrete handles. Anyone who has seen the figures — and the figures are on gevolgenkaart.nl, konsequenzkarte.de, konsegwenzi.mt, eu.gevolgenkaart.nl and trump-spiegel.openvizier.org — knows that the European choice in 2026 is no longer between party A and B, but between being ground down or reformed.

Nova Democratia is the reform proposal. It is meritocratic without being populist. It is pro-European without being Brussels-fundamentalist. It is industry-oriented without being protectionist. It positions itself in a space that no existing EP group occupies, while in every European capital it can appeal to voters at somewhere between 8 and 22 percent — modelled as enough for a blocking minority in the European Parliament and for coalition participation in several member states.

The content of this manifesto is fixed in five core points. The form — party, manifesto coalition, or hybrid — this document deliberately leaves open. Anyone who wishes to carry the manifesto can do so as a new formation or as an intra-party current. Both are legitimate. Both demand different investments.

Diagnosis — what the figures show

Before the solution, the diagnosis. Five observations that have been developed in five Consequences Map pieces and are here brought together on one page.

Observation one — the national vote bounces off EU reality

Roughly seventy percent of all new national legislation in EU member states is direct transposition of EU directives. For Malta higher, for Germany and France somewhat lower. The national parliament debates how, not whether. The democratic expression sits in The Hague, Berlin, Rome or Valletta. The legislative reality sits in Brussels.

Observation two — Brussels is a net-impoverisher

The cumulative effect of Pillar Two, CBAM, Fit-for-55, the Migration Pact and NGEU-MFF on the European prosperity base is a net loss of five to fifteen percent of income or turnover by 2030. Per scenario different; structurally the same in direction. Almost all scenarios lose; only institutional Brussels itself wins (growing budget, growing competence sphere).

Observation three — Trump on top of Brussels, not next to it

Trump's reciprocal tariffs hit the European prosperity base that Brussels had already weakened. No way out. A German Mittelständler that already lost twelve percent turnover to Brussels loses another thirty percent to Trump. The sum is not an addition but a multiplication — the cascade produces exponential rather than linear effects.

Observation four — existing parties offer no escape route

Modelling of the VVD, CDU, Fratelli d'Italia, PiS, S&D-equivalents, AfD, PVV, Rassemblement National and Vox shows that none of these parties produces a materially different outcome at the third-order level. The pressure from Brussels and Washington overshadows the national policy space. Voting for party A instead of party B produces, in the model, the same third-order effect.

Observation five — there is one green column

A meritocratic alternative — consistently designated in the Consequences Map series as Nova Democratia or VMP — does produce a net positive result in the models. Plus two to eight percent for citizens, plus thirteen to fourteen percent for businesses, by 2030. No utopia — arithmetic. But no existing party is running this programme today.

The five core points — five concrete handles that make the green column possible.

The five core points

Here follow the five core points in full elaboration. Each core point has a diagnosis, an instrument, a target figure and a timeline. Together they form the Nova Democratia column from the Consequences Maps.

Core point one — Energy autonomy by 2030

Diagnosis. Europe has for ten years accepted high energy prices as the inevitable price for the Net-Zero-by-2050 objective. A European gas MWh sits at 12 to 14 euros; an American one at 2 to 3. A European kWh of electricity costs industry 12 to 18 cents; the American one 6 to 8. The direct consequence is industrial relocation — BASF, Volkswagen components, ArcelorMittal steel — to Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi.

Instrument. Recognise nuclear energy as a core technology, not as a transitional phenomenon. Scale up French and Czech experience via a common European nuclear energy fund of 200 billion euros for the period 2027-2035. At the same time accelerated permitting for LNG terminals and pipelines, with environmental objection procedures concluded within 90 days. Net-Zero-2050 remains an objective, but without dogmatic year-by-year steps that destroy competitiveness.

Target figure. European gas MWh price down to 4 to 6 euros by 2030. Industrial electricity price down to 8 to 10 cents per kWh. Result: preservation of European chemistry, steel and heavy industry; prevention of an industrial flight that has already begun in 2026.

Timeline. Q1 2027 start of the European nuclear energy strategy via a COREPER proposal. 2027-2030 accelerated permitting under a new EU directive 'Strategic Energy Permitting'. 2030 visible effect on industrial investment decisions.

Core point two — Industrial rebuilding without a subsidy roulette

Diagnosis. The Inflation Reduction Act of the United States and Chinese industrial subsidies have forced Europe into its own subsidy roulette: the Important Projects of Common European Interest mechanism. The result is that member states outbid one another for one semiconductor plant while the total European industrial base shrinks. The single market — Europe's most powerful instrument — is being under-used.

Instrument. A Strategic Industries Compact that replaces IPCEI with one common European investment mechanism, targeted at four strategic sectors: semiconductors, batteries, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace/defence industry. Member states no longer outbid one another; Brussels decides, after consultation, where projects land on the basis of industrial clustering. Alongside this a 'single market test' for all new EU regulation — if a rule does not improve internal market functioning, it is not adopted.

Target figure. Preservation of European semiconductor capacity of at least fifteen percent worldwide (currently six percent). Preservation of European pharmaceutical development capacity of forty percent (currently twenty-eight). A European battery self-sufficiency of 60 percent of own demand by 2030.

Timeline. Q3 2027 Strategic Industries Compact as a Commission proposal. 2028 ratification and implementation. 2030 first measurable clustering effects.

Core point three — Renegotiate Pillar Two

Diagnosis. The OECD Pillar Two implementation obliges all EU member states to a corporate tax minimum of fifteen percent. At the same time the United States under OBBBA maintains its corporate tax at twenty-one percent without Pillar Two conformity. The effect: European enterprises taxed in Europe lose relative competitive position against American competitors, and outflow to the US accelerates.

Instrument. Immediate EU renegotiation of Pillar Two for a European bandwidth of fifteen to twenty-five percent, with deductions for productive investment (research, development, machine investment, energy transition). An effective tax burden of twelve to twenty percent thereby becomes possible for industrial enterprises, while non-productive fiscal arbitrage (pure holding structures, IP arbitrage without substance) does fall under fifteen percent.

Target figure. Preservation of European corporate tax competitiveness against the US. Halt to the accelerated outflow of EU headquarters to Delaware and Texas. Preservation of the Maltese, Irish and Luxembourg fiscal models within a European coherence.

Timeline. Q4 2026 EU renegotiation announcement in ECOFIN. 2027 OECD renegotiation. 2028 implementation of new directive. Here lies the highest risk — other OECD partners (Japan, UK) will resist. But the alternative — continued outflow — is unsustainable.

Core point four — Meritocracy as a weapon

Diagnosis. Europe has over the past two decades built up a complex system of diversity quotas in public procurement, EU fund management, academic financing and labour market regulation. The intention was inclusive — the outcome is that contract award is ever less based on quality and delivery times. At the same time Trump's Buy-American policy in effect uses a meritocratic selection in favour of American suppliers, regardless of demographic factors.

Instrument. A 'Capacity-First Procurement Directive' that replaces diversity quotas in public procurement with capacity quotas: demonstrable delivery history, technical depth, delivery-time reliability. For academic financing (Horizon Europe, ERC) a comparable switch — not demographic but scientific selection. For labour market regulation a statement of principle that anti-discrimination is preserved, but that positive discrimination (quotas) is replaced by capacity-based priority.

Target figure. Halt to the European losing streak in public procurement (approximately 18 percent quality-price-ratio deficit against comparable American procurement according to DG GROW 2025). Preservation of leadership on scientific productivity (publications per research hour).

Timeline. Q1 2028 Commission proposal Capacity-First Procurement. 2028-2029 EP handling. 2030 implementation. Politically the most controversial point — the loss of diversity quotas cuts symbolically hard. The substantive defence lies in the figures: meritocracy wins over any alternative on the medium term.

Core point five — Migration selection on contribution

Diagnosis. The EU Migration Pact 2026 distributes migration flows across member states via a mandatory solidarity mechanism. It takes hardly any account of the productivity contribution of migrants or the absorption capacity of receiving societies. The American model under Trump-II lies at the other extreme — deportation as an instrument, with humanitarian costs that Europe will never accept.

Instrument. A European 'Productive Migration Framework' that retains the Migration Pact in its solidarity component (humanitarian migration remains European-collectively borne) but for economic migration introduces a selection on qualifications, language knowledge, age profile and labour market demand. No quotas; a points system as Canada, Australia and New Zealand successfully apply. At the same time a radical acceleration of asylum procedures (90-day decision as binding deadline) in order to make European capacity for humanitarian migration effective.

Target figure. European labour migration from 1.2 million per year (currently) to around 800,000 higher-qualified plus 400,000 humanitarian, with asylum handling of 90 days. Reduction of illegal migration through consistent rejection of non-bona-fide applications — as the Danish model shows in practice.

Timeline. Q3 2027 Productive Migration Framework as an EP amendment to the Migration Pact implementation. 2028 entry into force. 2030 measurable shift in migration composition.

Positioning in the political landscape

Nova Democratia takes a specific position on two axes: industry versus redistribution, and EU-competence versus nation-sovereignty.

Nova Democratia (ND) in the European political landscape, positioned on the pro-industry / reform-oriented EU axis.

On the first axis Nova Democratia places itself emphatically on the pro-industry side. This is not an ideological choice but a diagnostic one: the European prosperity base is industrial; without industrial capacity, the fiscal space for any redistribution disappears. The choice is therefore not 'industry or redistribution' but 'industry as the condition for sustainable redistribution'.

On the second axis Nova Democratia positions itself exactly on the horizontal axis — not pro-EU-expansion, not pro-nation-sovereignty, but pro-EU-reform. Keep Brussels, reform Brussels. Renegotiate Pillar Two, do not abolish it. Redesign CBAM, do not throw it away. Supplement the Migration Pact, do not destroy it.

This positioning is unique. On the pro-industry side of the quadrant sit only ECR (in a more nation-sovereignty position) and Renew (in a much more EU-expansion position). Volt and EPP sit both on the pro-EU-competence side. PfE and ESN sit both on the pro-nation-sovereignty side. The bottom-right-middle quadrant is empty.

The electoral potential in this quadrant — based on Eurobarometer 2025 and KAS-Adenauer Lifestyle segmentation 2024 — is estimated at 8 to 12 percent in France, 10 to 14 percent in Germany, 12 to 16 percent in Italy, 6 to 10 percent in the Netherlands, and 4 to 8 percent in Poland. At EU level this would translate into 50 to 80 EP seats — enough for a blocking minority in every coalition and for coalition participation in several member states.

Party structure proposal

Nova Democratia can be realised in three ways: as a new party, as a manifesto coalition of existing centre parties, or as a hybrid. This manifesto argues for the hybrid route.

Path one — new European party formation

Advantage: full control over message, candidates and execution. Faster pace of decision-making. Possibility to follow the Macron trajectory — from foundation to government power in 13 months.

Disadvantage: enormous financial investment (Macron's En Marche campaign cost 16 million euros just for the first twelve months). High risk of a marginal result (2–3 percent without seats) if the event component does not cooperate. A longer road to governing power because infrastructure is lacking.

Path two — manifesto coalition of existing centre parties

Advantage: existing parties have infrastructure, membership, financing and candidate pool. The manifesto can achieve rapid wide diffusion. Intellectual ownership remains with the original authors.

Disadvantage: dilution is unavoidable because existing parties adapt for their existing base. No guarantee that the core points are adopted in original form. Risk of name-tagging without substantive uptake.

Path three — hybrid (recommended)

The Open Visor and the Consequences Map series remain in place as platform, continue to develop the figures, publish the Excel model openly, and offer the manifesto to two or three smaller meritocratic parties: Volt at EU level (strongest structural match), Italian Azione (overlap with Calenda's industrial-meritocratic line), German Freie Wähler (overlap on energy autonomy and migration selection), remnants of Spanish Ciudadanos (where still active), and Dutch JA21 (overlap on meritocracy and industry).

At the same time, under the name 'Nova Democratia', a registered European political party is established at EU level (under Regulation 1141/2014), with the aim of coordinating national meritocratic formations that in essence accept the manifesto. This is not a federal party — it is a coordination platform with a shared manifesto, comparable to how ALDE couples Renew at EU level.

Structure:

• A coordinating secretariat of five persons, based in Brussels

or Valletta, with an operational budget of around 800,000 euros per year.

• A political council of fifteen to twenty members, in which each

affiliated national formation has two seats plus three to five independent experts (industry, taxation, migration, energy, communication).

• An open data infrastructure — the Consequences Map models plus

additional scenario models — accessible to all affiliated formations.

• A common spokesperson policy: all affiliated parties

commit to defending the five core points in their national campaigns, but within that may set nation-specific accents.

Candidate profile

A political movement stands or falls with its candidates. For Nova Democratia a specific profile applies — not for exclusive selection, but to make the substantive positioning credible.

Five core qualities

One — Productive background. The candidate has demonstrably worked in industry, SME, technology or applied science. No career politicians. No union managers. No consultants without execution experience. The credibility of the pro-industry frame stands or falls with candidates who themselves know productivity.

Two — Bilingual minimum, trilingual desirable. European politics demands European skill. English plus the national language as minimum; a third European language (German, French, Italian or Spanish) as strong preference. This excludes a large portion of current politicians — which is an improvement.

Three — No party history older than five years in EPP, S&D or Renew. The aim is not anti-establishment; the aim is credibly new. Someone who was a VVD member for twenty years can hardly convincingly argue that the VVD course — modelled as leading to 19 percent income loss — is fundamentally wrong. A restart period is necessary.

Four — Demonstrable numerical capability. The candidate understands Excel, understands a three-step model, understands why a cascade of EU directives leads to Italian pensioners losing six percent purchasing power. No academic degree required; but a visible ability to think and speak in figures.

Five — No populist means in communication. Whoever joins Nova Democratia commits to a specific communication style: the 'quiet analysis'. No shouting, no enemy images, no one-line emotions. Anyone who reverts to the Wilders, Le Pen, or AfD tone in order to score electorally leaves the manifesto.

Demographic distribution

No quotas (see core point four — meritocracy as a weapon). But an expected natural distribution: age spread 35–65 (younger lacks experience, older lacks adaptability to new European reality); geographic spread across Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western European member states (no overweight in one region); sectoral spread across industry, science, SME, and public service.

Selection procedure

For the European elections of 2029 — if path three is realised — a common candidate competition is organised via the affiliated national parties, followed by a European final round. Two criteria are binding: full endorsement of the core programme (no reservations on the five core points), and demonstrable fulfilment of at least three of the five core qualities. The definitive placement on lists happens nationally, but under observation of the Brussels secretariat.

Accession and financing

For existing parties

An existing national party can affiliate with Nova Democratia via a formal political declaration by which it:

• Recognises the five core points as its European programme (without

necessarily bringing all national policy under them).

• Sends a delegate to the political council in Brussels.
• Contributes to the coordinating secretariat (annual contribution

according to national party size: from 25,000 to 150,000 euros).

• Follows the quiet-analysis tone in its European communication — which

leaves its national communication free.

For individuals

Individuals can support Nova Democratia by:

• Membership of The Open Visor as platform (voluntary contribution 50

to 500 euros per year).

• Candidacy via an affiliated national party (see

candidate profile).

• Distribution of the manifesto, the Consequences Map pieces, and the

communication-kit materials through their own network.

Financing — build-up phase 2026–2029

The multi-year budget for build-up up to and including the European elections of 2029 is estimated at 12 to 18 million euros. This covers:

• Coordinating secretariat (800,000 euros × 4 years = 3.2 million)
• Communication and publications (1.5 million)
• Research and expansion of the Consequences Map series (1.5 million)
• Campaign support to affiliated national parties 2027–2029 (4 to

8 million)

• European campaign 2029 (2 to 4 million)

Financing comes from affiliated parties, individual donations, and — from the moment Nova Democratia has EP seats — EU party financing under Regulation 1141/2014 (approximately 1 to 3 million per year depending on seats).

Conclusion — the credible third way

Europe in 2026 faces three possible trajectories. The first — continuation of the current path — leads, in the model, to being ground down between Brussels's Pillar Two and Washington's reciprocal tariffs. A European prosperity base that is 5 to 15 percent smaller in 2030 than in 2026, with the industrial sector as the hardest hit.

The second trajectory is populist copying. Trump-style tariffs, anti-EU rhetoric, deportation extremism. This is politically attractive for parts of the electorate, but destroys the European legal and democratic foundations on which the stable welfare model rests. The price is higher than the gain.

The third trajectory is Nova Democratia. Adopting Trump's goals — industrial rebuilding, energy autonomy, productivity, talent retention — without his means. Reforming Brussels, not destroying it. Renegotiating existing EU instruments, not throwing them away. Meritocracy as a selection principle, not ethnocentricity.

This third path is, in the Consequences Map models, the only one with green outcomes. Not as certainty — as arithmetic under defined assumptions. But it is the only available model that in 2030 sees a European citizen and a European company win together.

Anyone who reads this manifesto receives three things. A diagnosis, grounded in five Consequences Maps and thousands of modelled calculations. A direction, summarised in five concrete core points. And an invitation to participate, in whatever form — as party, as movement, as individual.

The question to the European citizen, entrepreneur, politician and publicist is simple. Which trajectory do you choose? The figures are on the table. The choice too.

"The meritocratic middle is no compromise. It is the only

survival strategy. Whoever reads the manifesto and has seen the

figures, knows that the other paths are no alternatives — only

different forms of loss."

— Nova Democratia, manifesto core June 2026

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Methodological references and sources

The substantive figures and arguments in this manifesto are drawn from the Consequences Map series of The Open Visor, in chronological order:

• De Gevolgenkaart (Netherlands) — Piece I, gevolgenkaart.nl
• Die Konsequenzkarte (Germany) — Piece II, konsequenzkarte.de
• Mappa tal-Konsegwenzi (Malta) — Piece III, konsegwenzi.mt
• The Brussels Consequences Map (EU) — Piece IV, eu.gevolgenkaart.nl
• Trump as mirror (US impact) — Piece V, trump-spiegel.openvizier.org
• The Tipping Mechanics — Piece VI, the strategic sequel to this series

In addition are used: European Commission Strategic Programme 2024-2029, EPRS Pillar Two analyses, Fit-for-55 impact assessments DG CLIMA, NGEU-MFF proposal 2028-2034, White House Economic Report 2026, Bruegel Tariff Tracker, IMF World Economic Outlook 2026, Bipartisan Policy Center IRA stranded-investments report.

The Excel model with all 20 scenarios × 10 mechanisms × three orders becomes available on gevolgenkaart.nl when the platform goes live. Until that moment the methodology is reproducible via the scenario Python modules at openvizier.org/scenarios.

• • •

WRITTEN BY JACOBUS VAN MERKSTEIJN WITH EDITORIAL AI SUPPORT

THE OPEN VISOR — OPENVIZIER.ORG

NOVA DEMOCRATIA — MANIFESTO 2026

JUNE 2026