Drafted by the assistant (Perplexity Computer), 10 October 2026. Amounts are model calculations by the assistant in 2025 prices, without growth or behavioural effects, and have not been checked by the CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis). Years are expected periods.
The direction in one sentence
The Netherlands will only recover if it first earns its own way again: a small government, a simple tax system without exceptions, work that always pays more than not working, and entrepreneurs who keep investing in the Netherlands. Only then is there distribution, from growth instead of from debt.
Three rules guide every decision in this document:
1. Abolishing comes before enforcing. A rule that only works if someone checks it does not work in the Netherlands. Whoever receives no benefit allowance cannot commit fraud with it; whoever pays no tax on savings has nothing to conceal.
2. The government gives up first. Only when the government itself becomes a third smaller can working people be asked to accept a temporary cut.
3. Restoration comes from growth. Wages rise again as soon as the productive core grows, not because more is redistributed.
Where the Netherlands stands now
The productive core of the Netherlands, the part of the economy that produces for the outside world under domestic ownership (NEPK), is small: about 2.87% of GDP, according to a recalculation by the assistant on 8 October 2026. A large part of what the country earns besides that comes from a flow that nobody names out loud: drug exports of about €11.9 billion a year amount, by that calculation, to about 39% of the productive core.
The tax system reinforces this. It rewards hoarding wealth in houses, pension pots and private companies and taxes work, enterprise and risk-taking, as NRC columnist Marike Stellinga wrote on 9 October 2026. At the same time, work barely pays for some people: someone moving from social assistance into work is only better off with a full-time job at about 110% of the minimum wage (ESB).
The state can no longer enforce its own rules. Almost a quarter of police employees have at some point been threatened by criminals, sometimes with knowledge of their address or their children's school (politie.nl). In the Netherlands, whoever breaks the rules and is hard to find gets away with it; whoever can be found pays.
The real debt is much higher than the official one. The official EMU debt of the Netherlands was €524 billion at the end of 2025, 44.4% of GDP (CBS, Statistics Netherlands). It excludes committed obligations and implicit obligations for the state pension (AOW) and ageing-related care, and GDP overstates the productive capacity to carry it. With all four debt layers, after deducting pension assets and measured against productive capacity (PBW, €709 billion), the Netherlands comes to about 170% (assistant's calculation, 8 October 2026).
France shows where this ends. Its official public debt is above 119% of GDP (Le Monde), but with all future obligations included France comes to about 550% of GDP (indicative calculation by the assistant, September 2026), or about 485% of its productive capacity. For comparison: for Germany the total debt, explicit plus implicit, has been measured at 454% of GDP (Stiftung Marktwirtschaft, 2025). France has to save €54 billion in its 2027 budget, and on 6 October 2026 between 256,000 and 450,000 people took to the streets (Al Jazeera, AFP). Cutting without a worked-out plan leads to the street.
For the Netherlands, a real debt of about 170% of capacity means there is no room to bridge the rupture with new loans. Every expense in the year of the rupture has to be covered in the same year.
Where the Netherlands is heading
Around 2031 to 2033 the Netherlands looks like this:
a government that is a third smaller and limits itself to what works without checks;
one simple tax system: no benefit allowances, no box 3, and a total tax on business profit of 43.75% (25% profit tax plus 25% on distributed profit);
a poverty line at the absolute minimum, about €200–300 a month, and benefits of at most 70–80% of the minimum wage, so that work always pays;
entrepreneurs and capital that stay or return, because enterprise pays again;
a productive core that grows legally and replaces the drug flow.
The course in six steps
Step 0 — Now until March 2027: preparing the plan
Everything that has to happen later is prepared now. The amending laws are written out in full as one omnibus act: repeal of the Healthcare Allowance Act (Wet op de zorgtoeslag), the Housing Allowance Act (Wet op de huurtoeslag) and the Child-Related Budget Act (Wet op het kindgebonden budget); removal of the childcare allowance from the Childcare Act (Wet kinderopvang); removal of chapter 5 (box 3) of the Income Tax Act 2001; a single rate of 25% in article 22 of the Corporate Income Tax Act and in article 2.12 of the Income Tax Act (box 2); a cap on unemployment benefit in article 47 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Werkloosheidswet); a lower norm for couples in article 21 of the Participation Act (Participatiewet); and a new act on minimum services during strikes.
The plan gets no single face, but a group of bearers: employers and SMEs, mayors of large cities, independent economists. They are protected before they go public, and their personal data is shielded. The full plan, with figures and legal texts, is made public before anyone stands up for it. Nobody can shoot an idea that is on paper.
Written agreements are made with employers who support the plan: how much they invest, which jobs remain in the Netherlands and when wages rise again.
Step 1 — 2027: the rupture
Around the provincial elections of 17 March 2027 and the French presidential elections in April and May 2027, the cabinet gets stuck on the budget, asylum or the euro. Strikes and unrest follow. At that moment one fully worked-out answer is on the table. A crisis looks for an answer; whoever has it decides what happens next.
Step 2 — After the fall of the cabinet: the mandate
In early elections, this plan is what is at stake. Parties must say beforehand whether they support it. The plan reaches voters directly, through its own videos, social media and the shop floor of the participating companies, and through the airtime for government information that the Media Act 2008 (articles 6.5 and 6.6) already grants to the prime minister. With a majority in both chambers of parliament, the legislative package can no longer be blocked.
Step 3 — The first 100 days: doing what can be done at once
The new cabinet starts with what is possible without a new law. A hiring freeze is introduced across central government; departing civil servants are not replaced, outsourcing and external hiring stop. Defence, police and justice are exempt. Police and the Public Prosecution Service focus their capacity on ports, drug labs, money-laundering networks and violent youth gangs. Rejected asylum seekers from safe countries are returned quickly; the cabinet makes agreements on this with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
At the same time the cabinet asks parliament to approve at once the act on minimum services in healthcare, security, drinking water and energy. Borrowing to bridge the rupture is ruled out: with a real debt of about 170% of capacity, the strike year has to be covered in the same year. That is why the legislative package from step 4, and above all the abolition of the benefit allowances, must take effect as early as possible in the first year.
Step 3a — The eleven holes that must be closed at once
On 14 August 2026 Het Open Vizier mapped eleven policy domains where taxation costs more than it brings in. Together they amount to €20.8 to €24.8 billion a year in enforcement costs and lost revenue, plus about €15 billion in consequential damage to the economy. The anti-money-laundering regime alone ties up 13,000 FTE at the banks. Following the same rule as the rest of the course, these holes are not closed with more checks, but by removing the cause. The amounts in the table are the losses according to the article; how much of it actually comes back has not been calculated.
| Hole (loss per year) | Direct measure | Label | What it yields |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Anti-money-laundering regime (Wwft): net −€8.1 bn; 13,000 FTE at banks | Gatekeeper duty back to a risk-based core: no more mass checks on every customer and transaction; public capacity to police and prosecutors for targeted investigation. | B | Banks, notaries and accountants save a large part of about €5 bn in sector costs; legal customers and SMEs regain access to banking (de-risking damage €6.5 bn). |
| 2. Undeclared work: −€4.1 bn; about 400,000 people | Make declared work cheaper than undeclared work: lower charges on work at the bottom; benefits at most 70–80% of the minimum wage, so that undeclared earnings on top of a benefit pay less. | B | Wage tax and contributions on part of about €4 bn in circuit turnover. |
| 3. VAT on illegal drugs: −€2.0 bn | Taxation is impossible (Court of Justice of the EU). Therefore: strengthen asset confiscation; the Public Prosecution Service seized a record €433 million in 2025. | A | More criminal assets confiscated. |
| 4. VAT carousel fraud: −€1.7 bn | Extend the existing reverse-charge scheme to all fraud-prone goods and emission allowances: the buyer remits the VAT, so there is no VAT left to disappear with. | B | Most of the fraud disappears, without extra investigation. |
| 5. Corporate tax via underground banking: −€1.05 bn | Profit tax to 25 + 25 makes avoidance less rewarding; FIOD capacity on hawala and crypto mixers. | B | Less incentive to keep profit off the books. |
| 6. Under-declared e-commerce VAT: −€0.55 bn | Have the sales platform itself remit the VAT instead of checking each parcel; align with the EU abolition of the €150 exemption. | B (EU) | A level playing field for Dutch web shops. |
| 7. Undeclared crypto in box 3: −€0.53 bn | Abolish box 3 (step 4). | B | The hole no longer exists; the control capacity is freed up. |
| 8. Illegal cigarette factories: −€0.33 bn | No further excise increases; Combiteam Smoke continues targeted investigation. | A | Less price incentive for illegal production. |
| 9. Wage tax on platform work: −€0.32 bn | Platforms withhold a fixed tax at source on every payment, with no dispute about false self-employment. | B | Simple collection without checks per assignment. |
| 10. Red diesel fraud: −€0.17 bn | Reduce the excise difference with Belgium instead of checking at the border. | B | The fraud advantage of €0.50 per litre largely disappears. |
| 11. Other small items: −€0.5 bn | Box 3 rental income disappears with box 3; bundle the remaining items in one service. | A/B | Small gain, less fragmentation. |
Step 4 — Year 1: one legislative package, in one go
The whole package goes through both chambers at once: benefit allowances gone, box 3 gone, profit tax 25 plus 25, WBSO (R&D tax credit) gone, benefits capped, the government a third smaller and the administrative burden on businesses back to a third or a quarter. Whoever submits the package in parts loses it piece by piece. The strikes that follow are sat out; the cabinet does not back down.
Step 5 — Years 2 to 4: recovery
The savings go first to reducing the real debt. After that, the burden on work and enterprise goes down. Entrepreneurs who stayed invest; entrepreneurs who left get a reason to come back. The productive core grows legally and takes the place of the drug flow.
Who will resist, and how the course deals with it
The trade unions will strike; that is their right under article 6(4) of the European Social Charter. The course takes this into account: coverage within the same year and minimum services are in place before the strike begins, and the moment at which wages rise again is fixed in advance, so that the strike has an end date.
Recipients of unemployment benefit and social assistance will go to court. The cap on unemployment benefit therefore applies only to new benefits, not to current ones; that leaves little ground for an appeal to the right to property under the ECHR. In social assistance, the norm for single people remains at 70% of the minimum wage; the reduction applies to couples and families.
Brussels will react because the deficit in the year of the rupture rises above 3% of GDP. The cabinet therefore submits a multi-year recovery path to the European Commission in advance: the deficit is temporarily higher, then lower than now. Eastern European member states have no case, because all rules apply equally to Dutch citizens and other EU citizens.
The United States and China will each defend their interests; China showed this in October 2025 at Nexperia, when it blocked the export of chips from China. During the rupture the Netherlands therefore opens no new conflict with either of them, and builds up stocks of critical raw materials and chips in advance.
Farmers are allies: they get fewer rules, and help and protection when criminals approach them for their barns. The army is exempt from the cuts. Parties that want more rules, such as the Party for the Animals, will resist; environmental rules that work at the source, without checks afterwards, therefore remain in place.
The underworld will respond with violence. That is why security comes before everything, every query in police systems is logged, and the plan continues if one of the bearers falls away.
The press will criticise and sometimes report incorrectly. The answer is a rebuttal with figures on the same day, and in the case of serious, damaging inaccuracies, summary proceedings for rectification under article 6:167 of the Dutch Civil Code. The press itself is not restricted.
What it costs and what it yields
The package yields a net €15.1 billion in 2029 and €19.0 billion in 2031, or €30.5 billion if healthcare spending also falls by 10%. In the year of the rupture it yields almost nothing yet, because the shrinking of the government is only getting under way and about €2.6 billion in unemployment benefit is added.
On top of that come the eleven holes from step 3a: together €20.8 to €24.8 billion a year in enforcement costs and lost revenue according to Het Open Vizier. Which part of it comes back has not been calculated and is therefore not included in the coverage.
A strike by 5% of working people for a year costs about €59 billion in production and €25.5 billion in government revenue. At 10% it is double: €118 billion and €51 billion.
Because borrowing is not an option, that loss has to be covered in the same year. Abolishing the benefit allowances (up to €22.3 billion) and stopping external hiring (up to €3.3 billion) together yield up to about €25.6 billion. That covers a strike by 5% of working people, but only if both measures take effect at the start of the year. A strike by 10% is not covered by this; the shortfall of about €25 billion must then come from a faster shrinking of the government or from healthcare.
Where the course can fail
If no majority emerges in the elections, only step 3 remains: what the cabinet can do without a law.
If the package is submitted in parts, it is weakened part by part.
If the strike grows beyond 5% of working people, the loss is not covered in the same year; borrowing is impossible with a real debt of about 170%.
If countries of origin do not take back rejected asylum seekers, return remains a weak point.
If entrepreneurs leave before the lower charges take effect, the core shrinks further; that is why profit tax and box 3 come down already in year 1.
Regulating the drug market conflicts with the UN Single Convention of 1961; that measure is therefore not included in the course. The approach runs through raids and closing down money-laundering routes.
What must happen first
1. Write out the omnibus act in full, article by article.
2. Assemble and protect the group of bearers.
3. Make written agreements with the first employers.
4. Publish the plan with all figures and legal texts, well before March 2027.
Sources
NRC, column by Marike Stellinga, 9 October 2026 (screenshots provided by the user).
ESB, Tackling the poverty trap: https://esb.nu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/editie_pdfs_870388_tcm445-238018.pdf
Police, threats against police employees: https://www.politie.nl/nieuws/2024/juni/12/00-veel-politiemedewerkers-ervaren-bedreiging-door-criminelen.html
Al Jazeera, France: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/10/6/france-protests-what-we-know-as-schools-brace-for-nationwide-action
CBS, EMU debt end of 2025: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2026/13/inkomsten-uitgaven-en-schuld-van-de-overheid-boven-de-500-miljard-euro
Stiftung Marktwirtschaft, German total debt 454% of GDP (2025): https://www.stiftung-marktwirtschaft.de/inhalte/publikationen/detailansicht/ehrbarer-staat-update-2025-der-generationenbilanz/
Le Monde, French public debt: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2026/10/07/with-a-financial-crisis-looming-what-promises-can-french-presidential-candidates-make_6758341_5.html
AFP, demonstrations of 6 October: https://www.afp.com/en/gen-z-has-risen-tens-thousands-mass-tense-france-school-protests
CBS, poverty line: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2024/42/nieuwe-meetmethode-cbs-scp-en-nibud-brengt-armoede-scherper-in-beeld
Unemployment Insurance Act, art. 47: http://www.wetboek-online.nl/wet/Werkloosheidswet.html
Media Act 2008, art. 6.5–6.6: https://wetten-overheid.nl/wet/BWBR0025028
NRC, cost price of ecstasy: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2025/10/20/terwijl-de-politie-vooral-met-cocaine-bezig-is-loont-het-om-onder-de-radar-gewoon-weer-xtc-te-maken-a4909948
WODC, incidents in asylum reception: https://www.1ekamer.nl/9370000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvksvji1pf4wd/vmp5lh2e3nyx
Het Open Vizier, The eleven holes in Dutch tax collection, 14 August 2026: https://openvizier.org/nl/wat-opkomt/33-grondslagen-die-de-overheid-uitholt.html
Calculations by the assistant (NEPK 2.87%, drug exports ≈ 39% of NEPK, net yield of the package, strike costs, the Netherlands about 170% of PBW): Multi-year economic plan, version 16, 8 October 2026; France about 550% of GDP and about 485% of PBW: indicative calculations by the assistant, September 2026.